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IS A STATE'S TAxATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
CONSTITUTIONALLY LIMITED TO U.S. WATER'S EDGE:
APPLICATION OF WORLDWIDE COMBINED REPORTING
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California
114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994)
Raymond G. Russell
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court handed down in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board of California,1 on June 20, 1994, a 7-2 decision upholding California's
assessment of corporate franchise taxes2 on Barclays Bank PLC,3 based on an
apportionment of its income which was calculated as including the income of its
worldwide subsidiaries.4 In a companion case, Colgate-Palmolive Co. v.
Franchise Tax Board of California,' the Court considered, in the context of a
domestic parent, similar issues.
Few United States tax policy controversies have created as much international
commotion as the disputes revolving around the Barclays case. The taxing
authority of the State of California was upheld despite an onslaught of amici
briefs from foreign trading partners6 expressing their disdain for the worldwide
1. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
2. Id. at 2278.
3. Actually, the petitioner in this case, Barclays Bank PLC, succeeds in interest in the tax refund claims of
Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) and Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Id. at 2274. BBI was a
United Kingdom corporation which wholly owned the California banking corporation Barcal. Id. BBI carried
on business in the United Kingdom and in thirty-three other countries and territories. Id. Barcal and BBI were
members of the United Kingdom based Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise. Id. The Barclays
Group is composed of over 220 corporations doing business in some sixty nations; no more than three of those
entities did any business in the United States. Id. at 2274, 2279.
4. Id. at 2271. Various other states apply a version of worldwide combined reporting, including Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Utah. J. William McArthur, Jr. &
Kendall L. Houghton, In Barclays, US. Supreme Court Finds for California, Which was Banking on It, 81 J.
TAX'N 176, 178 (1994). Thirteen states filed or participated in amici briefs supporting California's use of
worldwide combined reporting. These states were Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Nicholas S. Freud &
Walter M. Kolligs, US. Supreme Court Upholds Worldwide Reporting and Unitary Taxation, 5 J. Iwr'L TAX'N
340, 341 n.3 (August 1994).
5. 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).
6. The governments of the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland submitted amici briefs in support of Barclays. Id. at 2284. This group comprises most of the
United States' trading partners. Id. at 2289. Diplomatic notes complaining about the use of the worldwide
combined reporting method by the states have been received by the Department of State from nearly every
developed nation in the world. Id. at 2290. The parliament of the United Kingdom has gone so far at to enact
retaliatory legislation that would tax dividends received from subsidiaries located in the United Kingdom to the
United States corporations which owned them. Id.
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combined reporting method,7 as well as pressure from the Executive Branch.8
The Court, while reaffirming that the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution prevent states from imposing taxes on nonresidents based on the
income earned beyond the taxing state's border,9 upheld California's use of a
worldwide combined reporting method.1" The majority opinion, applying a case-
by-case analysis derived from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady," Container
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,2 and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 3
determined that the taxation method as applied by the State did not prevent the
federal government from "speaking with one voice" in international tax treaties
and in international commerce," and, thus, that the method did not violate the
"dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause.' The Court also did not agree with
petitioners' contention that the Due Process Clause was violated because the
"reasonable approximations" mechanism for reducing the compliance burden
was standardless.'
This Note will discuss the difference between the separate accounting scheme
applied by the federal government and the worldwide combined reporting
method; the factual background and procedural history of the instant case; the
more recent developments involving the authority of the states to tax corpora-
tions operating within the states' borders in the manner they choose; the holdings
of the instant case, and the differing views of the justices in Barclays. In addi-
tion, this Note will examine the effects of the Barclays decision on the Dormant
Commerce Clause as a limitation on the states' taxing power, the potential of
continued or expanded use by the states of worldwide combined reporting, and
the possible adoption by Congress of the worldwide combined reporting method
as the method of taxation to be applied to international corporations by the feder-
al government.
II. SEPARATE ACCOUNTING VS. WORLDWIDE COMBINED REPORTING
Before a thorough understanding of the Court's holding in Barclays can be
reached, one must understand the basic distinctions between a separate account-
ing method and a worldwide combined reporting method as well as the possible
ramifications of those distinctions. Although there are differing views on the
7. Id. at 2289-90.
8. Id. at 2285. The Court held that Executive Branch communications could espouse federal policy, but
that they "lack[ed] the force of law" and could not render California's use of worldwide combined reporting
unconstitutional. Id. at 2286.
9. Id. at 2272.
10. Id. at 2286.
11. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
12. 463 U.S. 159, 185 (1983).
13. 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979).
14. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2281 (1994) (quoting Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
15. Id. at 2276. The Court stated that there was a self-executing aspect of the Commerce Clause which pro-
hibits discrimination against interstate (or foreign) commerce and that the Court's jurisprudence deems this
aspect to be the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause. Id.
16. Id. at 2278.
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potential ramifications of the use of one method over the other,17 the following
discussion should prove to be a useful distillation of the basic functioning of the
methods and the distinctions involved.
A. Separate Accounting Method
The United States imposes its income tax on a corporate income based method
of "separate accounting."'" All major developed nations use this method of
apportioning income among taxing sovereigns. 8
"Separate accounting is a technique of carving out of the overall business of
the taxpayer the activities taking place, the property employed in, and the income
derived from, sources within a single State, and by accounting analysis ascertain-
ing the profits attributable to that portion of the business."2 The separate
accounting method, in contrast to worldwide combined reporting, treats each cor-
porate entity singularly to determine income tax liability.21 This method, when it
can be and is appropriately applied, taxes entities operating within the taxing
body's jurisdiction only on the income recognized on their own books.22 A for-
eign corporation, under the Internal Revenue Code, only reports income suffi-
ciently connected with the entity's engagement of a United States trade or busi-
ness and income derived from a United States source.23 A domestic corporation
reports all income, whether foreign or domestic, and receives a credit for the
payment of qualifying taxes to foreign sovereigns.24
One risk associated with determining tax liability based on separate accounting
is that a multinational conglomerate will manipulate transfers of value among its
subsidiaries or components to reduce the conglomerate's total tax liability.2 To
retard such manipulation, a taxing jurisdiction must ensure that such transac-
tions, or transfers of value, are returned based on an "arm's length" value. 26 A
taxing jurisdiction must therefore ensure that such transfers of value are reported
17. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon & William J. Wilkins, Memorandum to Congress: You Wouldn't Like
Worldwide Formula Apportionment, 65 TAX NoTEs 1259, 1265 (Dec. 5, 1994); Benjamin F Miller, None Are So
BlindAs Those Who Will Not See, 66 TAx NOTES 1023, 1024 (Feb. 14, 1995).
18. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273. Separate accounting is also often referred to as the "arm's-length"
approach. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 184 (1983).
19. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
20. 1 J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES,
8.03 (2d ed. 1993).
21. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273.
22. Id. The Court in Container Corp. described the effects of separate accounting as follows:
Under the "arm's length" approach, every corporation, even if closely tied to other corporations, is
treated for most-but decidedly not all-purposes as if it were an independent entity dealing at
arm's length with its affiliated corporations, and subject to taxation only by the jurisdictions in
which it operates and only for the income it realizes on its own books.
Container Corp., 459 U.S. at 184.
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to reflect true market value.27 Some commentators, as well as the Court, adopt
the view that the result is somewhat arbitrary in any event.28
B. Worldwide Combined Reporting
The worldwide combined reporting method is, basically, a variation of the "uni-
tary method."29 It is another means of determining the portion of the income of a
multi-jurisdictional entity that can be taxed by a jurisdiction. The unitary
method:
rejects geographical or transactional accounting, and instead calculates the local
tax base by first defining the scope of the "unitary business" of which the taxed
enterprise's activities in the taxing jurisdiction form one part, and then appor-
tioning the total income of that "unitary business" between the taxing jurisdic-
tion and the rest of the world on the basis of a formula taking into account
objective measures of the corporation's activities within and without the juris-
diction."0
Basically, a business is unitary if it "exhibits functional integration, centraliza-
tion of management, and economies of scale."" l Stated differently, "[i]f the oper-
ation of the portion of the business done within the state is dependent upon or
contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the operations are
unitary."
32
The worldwide combined reporting method can be seen as being comprised of
two components or aspects: a unitary business and formula apportionment.33
Once there is a determination that an entity is a part of a unitary business, and
which other entities comprise the unitary business, a jurisdiction must then apply
a formula which apportions the income of that business within and without the
jurisdiction.34  The formula commonly applied by the states using a unitary
method is called the "three-factor" formula.3 ' The formula is based generally in
27. Id.
28. "Rules governing international multijurisdictional income allocation have an inescapable imprecision
given the complexity of the subject matter." Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268,
2279 (1994). "The problem with this method is that formal accounting is subject to manipulation and impreci-
sion, and often ignores or captures inadequately the many subtle and largely unquantifiable transfers of value
that take place among the components of a single enterprise." Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983). See also I J. HELLERSTEIN & W HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: CORPORATE INCOME
AND FRANCHISE TAXES 8.03 (2d ed. 1993) (identifying three "inherent defects" of separate accounting as a
method of dividing the income of a unitary business: compliance expense, difficulty of arriving at "arm's
length" prices, and the problems of treating an interdependent entity as independent).
29. Barclay's, 114 S. Ct. at 2272. "A final point that needs to be made about the unitary business concept is
that it is not, so to speak, unitary: there are variations on the theme, and any number of them are logically con-
sistent with the underlying principles motivating the approach." Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 167.
30. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 165.
31. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272 n.1 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Tax'n, 504 U.S. 768
(1992)).
32. Id. (quoting Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947)).
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equal parts,36 on the "proportion of a unitary business's total payroll, property,
and sales which are located in the taxing state. ' 7
Under a worldwide combined reporting method, as applied by California, a
"unitary business" is construed broadly 8 and then the "three-factor" formula is
applied to arrive at the amount of income that can be attributed to the unitary
business's operations in the jurisdiction.3 9 A jurisdiction then taxes the income of
all the entities comprising the worldwide unitary business based on the percent-
age derived from the three-factor formula.4 °
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE INSTANT CASE
The first of these two consolidated cases, Barclays, traveled a long road to
reach the Court. This refund suit was brought by two members of the Barclays
Group, a United Kingdom based multinational banking enterprise which trans-
acts business in sixty nations and includes 220 corporations. 1 One of the two
taxpayers, Barclays Bank of California (Barcal), was a California banking corpo-
ration owned wholly by the second taxpayer, Barclays Bank International
Limited (BBI).4 2 BBI, a United Kingdom corporation, had business which
reached thirty-three other countries and territories outside of the United
Kingdom. 3 The two companies were doing business in California and were thus
subject to California's franchise tax.44
Barcal computed its 1977 California franchise tax based only on the income
generated by its operations.4 ' BBI assumed that it was a participant of a unitary
business composed of itself and its subsidiaries.4 BBI did not include the
income generated by its parent corporation nor the income generated by the par-
ent's other subsidiaries."
The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board), Respondent here, audited the
1977 income year franchise tax returns of Barcal and BBI.48 The Tax Board,
determining that BBI and Barcal were a part of the worldwide unitary business
of the Barclays Group, assessed additional tax liability to BBI and Barcal.49 The
36. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 (1994). California, in 1993,
modified its "three-factor" formula to double the weight of the sales factor. Id.
37. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 170.
38. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2273. Generally, this would require the taxpayer to aggregate the income of both
affiliates operating outside of the United States and those operating within the United States. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. "Thus, if a unitary business had 8% of its payroll, 3% of its property, and 4% of its sales in
California, the State took the average-5 0/--and imposed its tax on that percentage of the business' total
income." Id.
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additional tax assessed for the 1977 income year was $1678 for BBI and
$152,420 for Barcal. 0
BBI and Barcal both paid the additional assessments and then brought suits for
refunds."' Barclays Bank, PLC (Barclays), the Petitioner in this case, is the suc-
cessor in interest to the tax refund claims of both BBI and Barcal. 2
Barcal and BBI prevailed in the superior court of California 3 by challenging
the constitutionality of the additional tax assessed under the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution. 4 The California Court of
Appeals also determined that the California unitary tax method of worldwide
combined reporting was unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause
when applied to foreign multinational businesses forming a unitary group.55 The
court made this determination because the method "not only implicates foreign
policy issues which must be left to the federal government but violates a clear
federal directive as well."56 Barcal's and BBI's fortunes were reversed by the
California Supreme Court 7 which held that the worldwide combined reporting
method of taxation did not impair the federal government's ability to "speak with
one voice" in the realm of foreign commerce regulation. 8 After reversing on the
Dormant Commerce Clause issue, the California Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of Barclays' claim that the
burden of compliance with the worldwide combined reporting method violated
both the Due Process Clause and the nondiscrimination requirement of the
Commerce Clause when applied to foreign-based multinationals.59 The compli-
ance burden issues were then decided against Barclays by the Court of Appeals.6"
The California Supreme Court denied further review,6' and the United States





54. Id. After a lengthy trial, BBI and Barcal prevailed in 1987 and the Tax Board appealed. Eric J. Coffill,
Supreme Court in Barclays Upholds California "s Use of Worldwide Unitary Method Involving Foreign Parent
Corporations, 64 TAx NOTES 371, 372 (July 18, 1994).
55. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 275 Cal. Rptr. 626, 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
56. Id. at 645. In determining that worldwide combined reporting implicated foreign policy issues which
must be left to the federal government, the court noted that "[t]he most obvious foreign policy implication of a
state tax is the threat it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading them to retaliate
against the Nation as a whole." Id. at 637 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
194 (1983)). The court further stated:
In 1985, Britain passed retaliatory legislation withdrawing a tax advantage for U.S.-based corpora-
tions doing business in both Britain and a unitary tax state. Though Britain stopped short of pulling
the procedural trigger to fully implement this legislation, the law had a retroactive provision that
impelled many American companies into preimplementation compliance. Moreover, Britain can-
celed a trade mission to Florida because that state applied WWCR to foreign-based multinationals.
And there were other similar cancellations. There was also evidence the United States has had prob-
lems in negotiating treaties because of objections to WWCR.
Id. at 638.
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Colgate's consolidated case6" also traveled a long road to reach the Court.
Colgate is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York.64 It owned some
seventy-five subsidiary corporations that operated entirely outside of the United
States.65 Colgate and its subsidiaries operating within the United States, as well
as the seventy-five subsidiaries operating outside of the United States, principal-
ly engaged in the manufacture and distribution of personal hygiene and house-
hold products.66 Colgate, like Barclays, conceded for the purposes of this litiga-
tion, that for the years in question, its worldwide business was unitary.67 Colgate,
therefore, was deemed a domestic based multinational enterprise.68
Colgate filed California franchise tax returns based on its 1970 through 1973
income." The income it reported from its foreign subsidiaries was based on a
separate accounting basis, 70 rather than based on worldwide combined report-
ing.71 The Tax Board, upon determining that the taxes should have been comput-
ed on the basis of worldwide combined reporting, assessed a four-year deficien-
cy of $604,765.72 Colgate brought a refund suit after paying the additionally
assessed tax.73
Colgate began its suit, as Barclays had, in the California Superior Court, which
found that the worldwide combined reporting method had been condemned by
the federal govermnent as being impermissively intrusive of the federal govern-
ment's authority to regulate foreign commerce uniformly.74 The Court of
Appeals, deciding that the evidence of the Executive Branch's dislike of the
worldwide combined reporting method was insufficient to find it unconstitution-
al, reversed the lower court.75 Colgate then sought consideration by the
California Supreme Court which returned the case to the Court of Appeals to be
reconsidered in light of its then recent decision in Barclays.76 The Court of
Appeals again decided against Colgate and in favor of the Tax Board.7 7 The
California Supreme Court declined to review the case further, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.78
63. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994).




68. Id. at 2271.
69. Id. at 2275.
70. Id. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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IV HISTORY OF THE TAXING AUTHORITY OF THE STATES
The United States Constitution expressly delivers to Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."79 The
Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution prevent states from
imposing an income tax on nonresidents which taxes value earned outside of the
imposing state's borders.8" Thus, a state must only tax the income derived from
within its borders.81 However, when there is a unitary business operating in and
deriving income from more than one state or jurisdiction, "arriving at precise ter-
ritorial allocations of 'value' is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in prac-
tice."82 The Court has therefore repeatedly held that there is no singular formula
imposed on the states by the Constitution for determining the income which was
derived from that state and that a taxpayer must show by clear and cogent evi-
dence that the tax imposed results in taxation of values earned outside the bor-
ders of the taxing state before the taxing scheme will be held to violate the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses.83
The Court in Complete Auto84 was presented with a Mississippi tax imposed on
interstate corporations for the privilege of doing business in the state.85 The tax
provided that
[t]here is hereby levied and assessed and shall be collected, privilege taxes for
the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this
state to be determined by the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales
or gross income or values, as the case may be, as provided in the following sec-
tions. 8
The taxpayer, Complete Auto Transit, Inc., was a Michigan corporation which
transported motor vehicles by motor carrier for General Motors Corporation.87
The vehicles were assembled outside of the state by General Motors and then
shipped by rail to Jackson, Mississippi.88 Once the vehicles had arrived in
Jackson, they were then loaded onto the taxpayer's trucks and transported to the
Mississippi dealers. 89
The Mississippi Tax Commission assessed a three-year deficiency against
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. in the amount of $122,160.59 for the sales of trans-
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State.Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (citing Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1938)).
81. Id.
82. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
83. Id.
84. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 10105 (1942 & 1972 Supp.) which is now codified at Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 27-65-13 (1990)).
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portation services for the period from August 1, 1968, to July 3 1, 1971.90
Another deficiency was assessed for the period from August 1, 1971, to July 31,
1972, in the amount of $42,990.89."'
The taxpayer paid the assessments under protest and sued for a refund,92 assert-
ing that "its transportation was but one part of an interstate movement, and that
the taxes assessed and paid were unconstitutional as applied to operations in
interstate commerce.
' 93
The Court rejected the assertion that a state tax on the privilege of doing busi-
ness is unconstitutional per se when applied to interstate commerce and over-
ruled Specter Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor4 which had so held.9" The Court
then considered the practical effects of the statute and applied a test which would
sustain a tax against a challenge under the Commerce Clause when "the tax is
applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to the services provided by the State."9 The taxpayer had made no other
argument than that the tax was unconstitutional per se because it imposed a tax
for the privilege of doing business which was interstate.97 The Court therefore
upheld the tax imposed by Mississippi on the taxpayer engaged in interstate trade
and established the test for deciding a challenge of such a tax under the
Commerce Clause. 8
The issue of taxation by a state of a multi-jurisdictional corporation was before
the Court in a somewhat different context in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles.99 The question before the Court was "whether a State, consistently with
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, may impose a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax on foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of
international commerce."' 0
The taxpayers were six Japanese shipping companies.'0 ' Each of the compa-
nies was incorporated under the laws of Japan, and each had its principal place of
business and domicile in Japan.' 2 The cargo containers sought to be taxed by
the State of California were owned by the taxpayers and were used exclusively
for the transportation of cargo in foreign commerce. 10 3 It was stipulated on
appeal that "[e]ach container is in constant transit save for time spent undergoing




94. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
95. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1977).
96. Id. at 279.
97. Id. at 289.
98. Id.
99. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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repair or awaiting loading and unloading of cargo"' 4 and that all of the contain-
ers were subject to Japan's property tax, and were in fact taxed there.
105
The containers, in the course of international commerce, passed through the
jurisdiction and some were there at any given time; the average stay of a contain-
er in the state was less than three weeks. 06 The containers were used in no
intrastate or interstate transportation of cargo which was not a continuation of the
international transportation.1"7 Any period of nonmovement or movement was
inseparable from the container's use in foreign commerce." 8
The ad valorem property tax was imposed on property present in California on
March 1 of any year.1 09 The average presence of containers during each year was
determined, and California assessed $550,000 on the value of the containers
determined to be present on the lien dates in 1970, 1971, and 1972.1 The tax-
payers paid the taxes under protest and sued for a refund challenging the consti-
tutionality of the taxes imposed. 1
The Court first reaffirmed that there was no immunity from taxation conferred
by the Constitution and that the fair share of State tax burden must be borne by
interstate commerce.12 Therefore, if the Complete Auto test was met, there would
be no impermissible burden imposed on interstate commerce. 13 The Court then
determined that if the containers were only interstate commerce instrumentali-
ties, the Complete Auto test would be applied and satisfied, and the Commerce
Clause inquiry would be concluded. 4
However, the Court determined that the relevant analysis was not the same if,
as was the case here, foreign commerce was involved 115 Congress' power to reg-
ulate foreign commerce required "a more extensive constitutional inquiry.""1 6 It
was determined that a Court must also inquire into whether the tax, notwith-
standing apportionment, creates a "substantial risk of international multiple taxa-
tion," and whether the taxing scheme precludes the federal government from
"speaking with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments."1 7
In support of its first additional inquiry, the enhanced risk of multiple taxation,
the Court stated that "[i]t is a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that
multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce Clause."1 8 The Court
104. Id.
105. Id.






112. Id. at 444.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 445.
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has required apportionment so that there would be no multiple taxation, "so that
no instrumentality is subject to more than one tax on its full value." '119 The basis
of approval of apportioned property taxation was the Court's ability to "enforce
full apportionment by all potential taxing bodies"; an ability which is absent
when one of the taxing jurisdictions is a foreign sovereign.120 Thus, if a foreign
sovereign imposes a tax on the full value of the property, any tax imposed by a
state will inevitably result in multiple taxation. 21 It was also noted by the Court
that there was no authoritative tribunal with the capacity to ensure that multiple
taxation did not occur when there was a foreign sovereign involved.12 2
As to the second additional inquiry, allowing the federal government to speak
with one voice, the Court reasoned that "a state tax on the instrumentalities of
foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal unifor-
mity is essential" '23 and that foreign commerce is "preeminently a matter of
national concern." '124 One of the primary problems the Court foresaw was that
"[i]f a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax structure, for-
eign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned
instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions." 25
The Court then determined that the tax in question met neither of the addition-
al inquiries. Japan had already levied a tax on the full value of property and any
further tax applied by a state, even if apportioned, would result in inevitable dou-
ble taxation. 2 Also, since both the United States and Japan had signed the
Customs Convention on Containers under which American owned containers
were not taxed in Japan and Japanese owned containers would not be taxed by
the federal government, the imposition of a tax by California would create an
acute risk of retaliation by Japan and would prevent the federal government from
"speaking with one voice." '127 Therefore, it was held that the tax sought to be
imposed on foreign commerce by California was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause 28 with the Court stating that "[e]ven a slight overlapping of
tax - a problem that might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context -
assumes importance when sensitive matters of foreign relations and national sov-
ereignty are concerned."
1 29




123. Id. at 448.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 450. The Court further stated that
[sluch retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in general,
not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would suffer. If other States followed
the taxing State's example, various instrumentalities of commerce could be subjected to varying
degrees of multiple taxation, a result that would plainly prevent this Nation from "speaking with one
voice" in regulating foreign commerce.
Id. at 450-51.
126. Id. at 452.
127. Id. at 453.
128. Id. at 454.
129. Id. at 456.
1995]
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The Court was again called upon to determine the states' authority to tax
multi-jurisdictional corporations in Container Corp. ofAmerica v. Franchise Tax
Board.3 ' The controversy again arose in California, but this time, in contrast to
Japan Line, the Court was faced with a tax on income and not a tax on tangible
property.
The taxpayer, Container Corporation of America, was a Delaware corporation
headquartered in Illinois which had operations in California and other states as
well as a number of foreign subsidiaries incorporated in the countries in which
they operated. 31  During the years 1963, 1964, and 1965, the taxpayer had twen-
ty foreign subsidiaries engaging in business.1 3 2 Additional franchise taxes were
assessed against Container Corporation in 1969.133 The contention of the Tax
Board was that the taxpayer should have included its overseas subsidiaries as part
of its unitary business instead of as passive investments.Y'4 When the Tax Board
calculated the tax liability as including the income of the subsidiaries, the tax lia-
bility increased for each of the three years in question. 35 Container Corporation
paid the additional amounts under protest and sued for a refund.
36
There were three questions presented for consideration by the Court: whether
the state courts were correct in determining that the taxpayer and its subsidiaries
composed a unitary business; whether the three-factor formula as applied to the
unitary business was so inaccurate as to violate the constitutional requirement of
"fair apportionment"; and whether California had an obligation under the
Foreign Commerce Clause to apply a separate accounting method (arm's length
analysis) as used by the federal government and most foreign sovereigns. 137 Tc
Court decided against the taxpayer on each of these issues.
As to the first issue involving the trial court's determination that the taxpayer
and its subsidiaries composed a unitary business, the Court stated that it would, if
reasonably possible, defer to the decision of the state courts in determining
whether a particular set of circumstances gives rise to a "unitary business.' 38
Thus, the Court would not interfere in the state court's decision if the determina-
tion of a unitary business was within "the realm of possible judgment.'1 39 Since
130. 463 U.S. 159 (1983). The clash of the amici briefs was on again as well. Many states submitted briefs
urging affirmance of the authority to use the worldwide combined reporting method; these included Idaho,
Utah, Illinois, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and North
Carolina. The National Governors' Association and the National Farmers' Union also urged affirmance. Id. at
162. Urging the Court to reverse the use of worldwide combined reporting were the Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the Committee on Unitary Tax, the
Confederation of British Industry, Gulf Oil Corporation, International Bankers Association in California,
Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell Petroleum, Sony Corporation, and the Union of Industries of the European
Community, among others. Id.
131. Id. at 163.
132. Id. at 171.
133. Id. at 174.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 175.
137. Id. at 163.
138. Id. at 175.
139. Id. at 176.
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there was here a substantial intertwining of activities, such as technical and
expansion assistance rendered to the subsidiaries by the taxpayer, the Court left
the trial court's decision undisturbed.
140
There was then a consideration of whether the formula applied to the unitary
business, the three-factor formula,141 fairly attributed the income derived within
the state.1 42 The taxpayer had the burden of proving that the income attributed to
California was "out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted" by
the taxpayer in that state. 143 The Court determined that both separate accounting
and formula apportionment were inexact when applied 144 and that the three-fac-
tor formula was widely approved because the combination of payroll, property,
and sales "appear in combination to reflect a very large share of the activities by
which value is generated." 145 Thus, the formula applied by California was deter-
mined to provide a fair apportionment of income.
146
The Court then turned to whether the Foreign Commerce Clause required the
state to apply a separate accounting scheme. 47  The additional inquiries to
Compete Auto that Japan Line established provided the applicable standard.1
48
In consideration of the first additional area of scrutiny, the enhanced risk of
multiple taxation, the presence of several similarities to Japan Line, in which the
Court concluded that the tax imposed was unconstitutional under the Foreign
Commerce Clause, were noted.'49 Such similarities included that the tax
imposed here, as in Japan Line, had resulted in actual double taxation,15 0 that the
double taxation stems from the substantial divergence in taxing schemes used by
California from the methods applied by the foreign taxing jurisdictions, that the
taxing method adopted by the foreign sovereigns is consistent with international
practice, and that the federal government, to the degree it has spoken, prefers the
international method (separate accounting).'
5'
However, the Court also found that there were several ways in which this case
could be clearly distinguished from Japan Line. The first difference was that the
controversy here involves a tax imposed on income rather than on tangible prop-
erty. 52 Also, the double taxation that occurred here was not the "inevitable"
140. Id. at 179-80.
141. The three-factor formula is composed of payroll, property, and sales. Id. at 183.
142. Id. at 180.
143. Id. at 181 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex. rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
144. Id. at 182.
145. Id. at 183.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 185.
148. Id. The two additional considerations when a state seeks to tax foreign commerce are the "enhanced risk
of multiple taxation," and the possibility that the taxing scheme will prevent the federal government from
speaking with one voice in foreign commerce matters. Id. at 185-86.
149. Id. at 187.
150. Id. "[I]n the sense that some of the income taxed without apportionment by foreign nations as attribut-
able to appellant's foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by California as attributable to the State's share of the
total income of the unitary business of which those subsidiaries are a part." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 188.
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result of the taxing scheme, as it was in Japan Line.'53 Finally, the third differ-
ence was that the tax fell on a domestic corporation rather than on a foreign par-
ent.
15 4
One very relevant consideration in the Court's decision was that California
would have had trouble avoiding double taxation even if it had adopted a separate
accounting scheme.1 55 This effect was attributed to the difference between a tax
on income and a tax on tangible property. 6 The Court stated that "[a]llocating
income among various taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance, as we have
emphasized throughout this opinion, to slicing a shadow.""1 7 The determination
was then made that it would be perverse to require California to give up its tax-
ing scheme and require it to use another which would also sometimes result in
double taxation.
1 5 8
The Court then turned to the "one voice" consideration which it determined to
be essentially another species of pre-emption analysis.1 5 9  Several factors were
deemed to be important in the inquiry involved. The tax in this case did not cre-
ate an automatic "asymmetry" in international taxation, and it was imposed on a
domestic entity as opposed to a foreign entity.16 Also, there was no explicit pre-
emption of this area by federal law. 61 The agreements in the international
treaties involved were found not to be applicable to the states.'62
Thus, the State's taxing scheme was upheld by the Court here,6 3 though it
reserved the question of the "constitutionality of combined apportionment with
respect to state taxation of domestic corporations with foreign parents or foreign
corporations with either foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries" for another
day.
164
In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 61 the Court con-
sidered a Florida tax imposed on the sale of fuel to airlines. 66 Florida had taxed
the sale of fuel to airlines based on a prorated mileage figure so that the portion
of tax payable by the airline was equal to the "ratio of its Florida mileage to its
worldwide mileage for the previous fiscal year."' 67 This dispute arose when the
153. The Court further elaborated that
[t]he "arm's-length" approach divides the pie on the basis of formal accounting principles. The for-
mula apportionment method divides the same pie on the basis of a mathematical generalization.
Whether the combination of the two methods results in the same income being taxed twice or in
some portion of income not being taxed at all is dependent solely on the facts of the individual case.
Id.
154. Id.




159. Id. at 193.
160. Id. at 195.
161. Id. at 196.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 197.
164. Id. at 189 n.26.
165. 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id.
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tax law was amended to establish a flat rate of five percent on a deemed price per
gallon. 168 The airlines were thus liable for the full amount of the fuel tax regard-
less of the portion of the fuel that was used outside of the state and regardless of
whether the airline did only a nominal amount of business within the borders of
the state.169 This amendment to the tax law substantially increased the tax liabili-
ty of foreign airlines with operations mainly outside the State of Florida. 7 '
Thus, another challenge to the taxing authority of the states was begun.
The taxpayer contended that this area of the law was completely pre-empted by
federal law and that the tax was unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause.171 The Court quickly determined that this area of the law was not pre-
empted by federal law and turned to the Foreign Commerce Clause issue.' 72
The Court stated that when there is a Dormant Commerce Clause issue,
whether foreign or domestic, and there has been no affirmative action by the fed-
eral government, "it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether
action taken by state or local authorities unduly threatens the values the
Commerce Clause was intended to serve."'73
The taxpayer conceded that the state tax met the four requirements of the
Complete Auto test 74 and that there was no threat of multiple taxation in this
instance. 7 Thus, the determination would hinge on whether the Florida tax pre-
vented the federal government from "speak[ing] with one voice.' 76 It was deter-
mined that the law in its current state acquiesced in the taxation by states of fuel
because the bilateral agreements'7 7 between the United States and other countries
only foreclosed taxation by the federal government and not by the states.
178
Thus, the Court construed silence to equal acquiescence and determined that the
Florida tax did not prevent the federal government from speaking with one
voice. 179 Florida was allowed to retain its method of taxation.
8
1
V THE INSTANT CASE
The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, determined first that





172. Id. at 7.
173. Id.
174. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
175. Wardair Can. Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id. The Court went on to note that
[t]axation by political subdivisions of either the United States or Canada are not mentioned, an
omission which must be understood as representing a policy choice by the contracting parties, espe-
cially in the light of the fact that the Resolution addressed this concern eight years before the United
States and Canada entered into the Agreement.
Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id. at 13.
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three of the four criteria set forth in Complete Auto."'1 The nexus requirement
was met because Barcal, BBI, and Colgate all did business in California during
the years at issue." 2
The fair apportionment standard was found to be satisfied since neither
Colgate nor Barclays established that the income attributed to California was out
of "all appropriate proportion" to the amount of business transacted by the tax-
payers in that state or the absence of a "rational relationship between the income
attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the enterprise." '183 Also, since
the state had provided "protection, opportunities[,] and benefits" to the taxpay-
ers, the tax was fairly related to the benefits provided by the state. 84
However, Barclays, but not Colgate, vigorously contended that the worldwide
combined reporting method of taxation violated the antidiscrimination compo-
nent of the Complete Auto test."' 5 Barclays contended that a foreign parent of a
domestic taxpayer would be "forced" to convert the financial and accounting
records of its subsidiaries worldwide into the currency, language, and accounting
principals of the United States and that the expense of such conversion would be
prohibitive. 186 It asserted, and the trial court found, that setting up a system with
the capacity of reporting the information required of its holdings worldwide
would cost $5 million and more than $2 million a year to maintain. 87 Thus, the
argument continued, the prohibitive burden of implementing and maintaining
such a system on a foreign parent gave a competitive advantage to the domestic
enterprise and therefore constituted "economic protectionism." '188
T11e ,our L ounu LieCs arguments to be unpersuasive and held that the claim of
unconstitutional discrimination against foreign commerce failed. 88 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the factual underpinnings of the con-
tention were infirm. 9 The tax regulations provided that the Tax Board was to
"consider the effort and expense required to obtain the necessary information"
and that it could accept reasonable approximations. 9 In fact, Barclays had been
allowed to make use of these provisions. It made computations based on reason-
able approximations and avoided the expense of which it complained. 92 The
Court of Appeals additionally determined that the actual compliance costs suf-
fered by Barclays were relatively modest in the years immediately preceding
those in issue, with the costs ranging from $900 to $1250.'7 Thus, the Court
181. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2276 (1994). See supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2277 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180-81 (1983)).
184. Id. (quoting Wilson v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2277n.11.
188. Id. at 2277.
189. Id. at 2278.
190. Id. at 2277.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2278.
193. Id. at 2278 n.13.
[VOL. 16:1
TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
determined that Barclays had not established that the taxing scheme, with its sys-
tem of reasonable approximations, systematically overtaxed BBI or Barcal in
particular or foreign enterprises in general.194
With the determination that the Complete Auto test was met, the Court next
considered the companion issue asserted by Barclays that the "reasonable
approximations" method of compliance with the taxing scheme violated due
process.19 Without any showing of an approximation that the Tax Board rejected
as unreasonable, Barclays asserted that foreign multinationals faced continuing
peril when filing tax returns because there was no standard for determining
which "reasonable approximations" would be accepted by the Tax Board.19
Thus, Barclays contended that it was the grant of "standardless discretion" which
violated due process. 97
In addressing the due process contention, the Court first noted that "reason-
ableness" is a time-honored standard permitting effective judicial review in a
"myriad" of situations. 98 It also noted that taxpayers were permitted to seek an
advance determination of the tax consequences of potential future courses of
action from the Tax Board.
199
The Court then stated that "[r]ules governing international multijurisdictional
income allocation have an inescapable imprecision given the complexity of the
subject matter" and held the taxing scheme was no more violative of due process
than it was of the antidiscrimination component of the Commerce Clause stan-
dard.
20 0
Having determined that the worldwide combined reporting method of taxation
was "proper and fair" under the Complete Auto test, the Court proceeded to
address the two additional areas of scrutiny required when a state seeks to
impose a tax upon foreign commerce.0 1 Arguments asserting the first of these,
the enhanced risk of multiple taxation, had previously been rejected by the Court
in Container Corp. in the context of a charge that the application of California's
worldwide combined reporting scheme unconstitutionally exposed the foreign
subsidiaries of a domestic parent to a risk of multiple international taxation.0 2
The Court noted that in Container Corp., even though there was actual double
taxation, it was held that California's worldwide combined reporting method was
not unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce Clause because multiple taxa-
tion was not the inevitable result of the taxing scheme and because the reason-
able alternative available to the state (separate accounting) "could not eliminate
the risk of double taxation. 20 3








202. Id. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
203. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2280 (1994) (quoting Container Corp.
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 191 (1983)).
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Barclays' argument hinged on the assertion that the instant situation should
compel a different outcome since application of the worldwide combined report-
ing method to foreign multinational corporations creates a more "aggravated"
risk of multiple international taxation than existed in the context of a domestic
parent.204 The Court again refused to "require California to give up one alloca-
tion method that sometimes results in double taxation in favor of another alloca-
tion that also sometimes results in double taxation" and decided to adhere to the
precedent set forth in Container Corp.205
The Court then turned to the issue "ultimately and most energetically" assert-
ed, that the worldwide combined reporting method as applied to Barcal, BBI, and
Colgate impaired federal uniformity "in an area where federal uniformity is
essential. 20 6 The decisions in Container Corp. and Wardair were the principle
guides to the Court in reaching its decision.0 7 The "one voice" issue was consid-
ered in these cases only after the state method of taxation was deemed to be oth-
erwise constitutional. °8
Earlier in the opinion it had been noted that the dormant or negative
Commerce Clause had a self-executing aspect which had long been understood
to provide protection from a state's interference in foreign commerce even when
Congress had not acted. 209 The Court found that the idea that Congress may pas-
sively indicate that certain action by a state does not "impair federal uniformity
in an area where federal uniformity is essential" was an underlying premise of
both Wardair and Container Corp.21 It was further stated that Congress "need
not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regu-
lation that discriminates against interstate commerce or otherwise falls short"
under the requirements of Complete Auto.
21 1
Having thus framed the Foreign Commerce Clause issue as one of the effects
of congressional silence, the Court declared that there was no specific congres-
sional intent indicated to bar the state action at issue.212 Contrarily, the Court
viewed its 1983 decision of Container Corp. as having "left the ball in Congress'
court."213 In the eleven years following the Container Corp. decision, Congress
could have enacted legislation requiring the states to apply the separate account-
ing method. 21 4 However, Congress had failed to enact numerous bills which
would have prohibited the taxing method involved in this dispute.2 5
204. Id. at 2279.
205. Id. at 2280 (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193).
206. Id. at 2281 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
207. Id. See supra notes 130-180 and accompanying text.
208. Id. at 2282.
209. Id. at 2276.
210. Id. at 2282 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2283.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2284.
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To shore up its position, the Court, as in Container Corp., also discussed the
Senate action on a United States/United Kingdom tax treaty. The history of the
treaty showed that it, as- originally negotiated, would have precluded the states
from applying the worldwide combined reporting method to United Kingdom
controlled taxpayers.21 The Senate refused to adopt this version of the treaty.217
The Court therefore determined that the taxing method applied by California
did not prevent the federal government from speaking with one voice since
Congress was willing to tolerate the state's application of the worldwide com-
bined reporting method.218
In quick succession, the Court also disregarded several other complaints. The
assertion that the worldwide combined reporting method was unconstitutional
because it was likely to provoke retaliatory action by foreign sovereigns, as evi-
denced by a large quantity of amici briefs, was discarded as directed to the
wrong forum.2 19 In response to the argument that the federal government has
continuously expressed a preference for the arm's length method, the Court stat-
ed that such a preference does not render a state's contrary method unconstitu-
tional.22
Finally, the assertion by Colgate that several Executive pronouncements consti-
tuted a "clear federal directive" was answered by the Court's statement that such
communications lacked the force of law and could not render California's other-
wise valid and congressionally condoned method of taxation unconstitutional.2 2
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg stated that Congress' voice in the area of foreign
commerce is the voice of the Nation, and neither the Court nor the Executive
Branch may intrude into its domain.222
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Commerce Clause Limitations on a State s Taxing Authority
After the decision in Barclays it seems clear that there is little room for chal-
lenging, on Foreign Commerce Clause grounds, a state's use of a worldwide
combined reporting method. In the absence of some indication of congressional
disapproval of the method, its use will be upheld regardless of the threatened
international reaction. The Court determined that, after Container Corp. and
Wardair, silence by Congress, when it could otherwise prohibit a state's use of
the taxing scheme, is implicit to inferring congressional permission for the use of
the method and that therefore federal uniformity is not impaired in an area in




219. Id. at 2285.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2286.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2282.
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requirements of Complete Auto and of Japan Line, after the Court's brisk treat-
ment in Barclays, will pose little threat to a state's application of the worldwide
combined reporting method to a foreign multinational corporation. As to
Colgate, a domestic parent, the Court was unanimous in upholding California's
application of the worldwide combined reporting method, a result which is not
surprising in light of its previous decision in Container Corp.
However, there are two areas under which a taxpayer might still challenge such
a taxing scheme after the decision in this case. These two areas are the unity of
the business involved and distortion.
The cases discussed in this Note do not change the fact that before a unitary
method, such as worldwide combined reporting, can be applied, there must be a
factual finding that the enterprise in question constitutes a unitary business. 24
Unity was not an issue in the instant case, as both Barclays and Colgate had sub-
mitted on this point and stipulated that the entities involved were part of a world-
wide unitary business.22
Under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a state is
not allowed to impose a tax on income arising out of operations carried on out-
side of that state.226 The burden is on the taxpayer to show by "clear and cogent
evidence" that the taxing scheme applied by a state results in such a taxation of
extraterritorial income.227 Also, the Court will defer, when reasonably possible,
to the determination of the state courts when deciding whether a business in a
particular set of circumstances constitutes a unitary business.228 Thus, in order to
colIeu r less than, worluwlue treatment, a taxpayer, -whether a domestic or for-
eign corporation, would have to dispute a finding that its business exhibited
"functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of
scale "229
The other area of possible contention for future taxpayers is that of distortion.
The Court has stated in Container Corp. that the three-factor formula applied to
a unitary business is appropriate because "payroll, property, and sales appear in
combination to reflect a very large share of the activities by which value is gener-
ated."23 Even so, the Court also notes that the formula is "necessarily imper-
fect."23' The weight given to each factor is essentially arbitrary, the three factors
do not include all of the factors arguably relevant to income from operations, and
the relationship between the factors and income is not exact.232
"The underlying assumption of formula apportionment is that each dollar of
payroll, property, and sales produces an equal amount of income or an equal
224. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
225. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2274, 2275 (1994).
226. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
227. Id. at 175.
228. Id.
229. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. at 2272 n.1.
230. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 183 (1983).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 184.
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quantity of product."2 3 While this assumption seems to be at least roughly cor-
rect as between the states in the United States, and in the context of jurisdictions
in which the taxpayer's unitary business operates that have at least somewhat
comparable taxing and economic conditions, the comparability it assumes proba-
bly does not exist on a worldwide basis.234 Thus, while the three-factor appor-
tionment formula has generally been upheld, there may be some room left for a
taxpayer to challenge such apportionment based on its distortive effect, in that
the three-factor formula as applied to a foreign multinational corporation creates
a situation in which the income apportioned to the state is "out of all appropriate
proportion to the business transacted by the appellant in that State. 235
Such a distortive effect has been found to be grounds for reversal, if the distor-
tion is great enough.236 Thus, a corporation could possibly show such a distor-
tion if in one of the jurisdictions an equal amount of income was derived as in
the taxing jurisdiction, but was based on unequal units of payroll, property, and
sales.2 37 The Court has also recognized this weakness in the assumption underly-
ing the three-factor formula:
The assumption has admitted weakness: an enterprise's willingness to invest
simultaneously in two jurisdictions with very different true rates of return might
be adequately explained by, for example, the difficulty in shifting resources, the
decreasing marginal value of additional investment, and portfolio-balancing
considerations.238
Therefore, as an example, assume that a foreign-based corporation (FB), which
only does business outside of the United States, wholly owns a domestic corpo-
ration (DB) which only does business inside the United States. 239 Also, assume
that DB operates in a state which applies the three-factor formula of apportion-
ment and that FB and DB are part of a unitary business. The companies generate
an equal amount of income from the same proportion of inputs (payroll, sales,
and property). In such a situation, part of the combined income of the unitary
business would be attributable to the domestic state. If DB and FB had total
inputs of 50 units each in payroll, property, and sales, the amount of their com-
233. Coffill, supra note 54, at 372. Such assumption has been stated by the Court as
[t]he three-factor formula, as applied to horizontally linked enterprises, is based in part on the very
rough economic assumption that rates of return on property and payroll-as such rates of return
would be measured by an ideal accounting method that took all transfers of value into account-are
roughly the same in different taxing jurisdictions.
Container Corp, 463 U.S. at 183.
234. Coffill, supra note 54, at 378.
235. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 181 (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex. rel. Maxwell, 283
U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
236. Hans Rees 'Sons, Inc., 283 U.S. at 135 (disallowing the use of an apportionment method when the dis-
tortive effect, or percentage increase in taxable income attributable to the state, of focusing on one factor was
more than 250%).
237. See Coffill, supra note 54, at 378.
238. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 183 n.20.
239. The following example is based on a similar example found in Coffill, supra note 54, at 378.
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bined income to be taxed by the state could be expressed as 1/3(50/100 + 50/100
+ 50/100) or as fifty percent (50%).
However, if DB's payroll cost were substantially higher than FB's, while
income and all other factors remained constant, a distortion could occur. If it is
assumed that DB requires 600 units of payroll to generate the same income as
FB, the percentage of income taxed by the domestic state could be expressed as
1/3(600/650 + 50/100 + 50/100) or as sixty-four percent (64%).
Therefore, while DB is generating the same percentage of the combined
income, fifty percent (50%), the domestic state is now taxing sixty-four percent
(64%) of the income of the combined business (DB + FB). The result is distort-
ed because the facts do not follow the basic economic assumption underlying the
three-factor formula, that a business will only operate where the cost of payroll,
property, and sales are at roughly equally efficient levels. As the Court recog-
nized in the previous excerpt from Container Corp.,24° this economic assumption
might have weak underpinnings in an international business. However, this
Commentator believes that any affront on the three-factor formula, revealing less
than a dramatic distortion, will be met with substantial resistance, and be disre-
garded by the Court.24
B. Potential Ramifications ofBarclays
Barclays is a clear victory for the use of a worldwide combined reporting
method by a state. The decision leaves few legal impediments in the way of a
state wishing to adopt such a method of taxation. However, it is this
Commentator's belief that the worldwide combined reporting. method will not be
widely embraced by the states, nor Congress, as a revenue generating tool.
Following the 1983 decision in Container Corp., several states reviewed the
possibility of adopting a worldwide combined reporting method.242 In response
to that decision by the Court and the following review by the states, the business
community became quite galvanized and took the fight to the legislatures. 43
They argued that the adoption or continued use of the method would be disas-
trous to a state's economic well-being.244 The strength of the anti-worldwide
combined reporting movement caught the attention of the legislatures, and many
states not using the worldwide combined reporting method began expounding
their non-use in hopes of exploiting a perceived advantage in marketing their
states for economic development.24 The effects were fairly dramatic, and within
a short period of time the states that applied the method overhauled their taxing
240. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
241. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 184 (disregarding a fourteen percent increase in taxable income attrib-
utable to the state because of its application of the three-factor method).
242. J. William McArthur, Jr. & Kendall L. Houghton, In Barclays, US. Supreme Court Finds for California,
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schemes to allow for some form of water's-edge limitation on reporting.24 Thus,
even though a state attempting to adopt the worldwide combined reporting
method will not face many legal impediments, it would probably meet an imme-
diate back-lash from a galvanized business community.
It should be stressed, however, that interest in combined reporting still exists.
In Louisiana, for instance, it is reported that the Louisiana Department of
Revenue and Taxation has begun "a study of combined unitary reporting as an
alternative to Louisiana's current income tax regime."247 Also of future interest
will be the stirrings of interest that are beginning in a Congress desperate to gen-
erate funds for everything from health care to the revenues lost from trade
treaties to deficit reduction. The Foreign Tax Compliance Act of 1994 was intro-
duced as a bill in the House of Representatives by Congressman Richard
Gephardt. 48 This bill proposes that the federal government abandon its use of
separate accounting and implement a worldwide unitary system similar to the
one used by California.249 Adoption by the federal government of the now con-
stitutionally approved method of taxation would have wide-ranging effects
indeed.25
VII. CONCLUSION
In one of the more far-reaching and important tax decisions in recent memory,
the Court, extending the principles enunciated in Japan Line and Container
Corp., has now indicated a clear "hands-off" approach to the states' authority to
implement unitary taxing methods. In particular, the worldwide combined
reporting method applied by California and its underlying three-factor apportion-
ment scheme seems to be becoming the standard by which the Court measures
other taxing methods. The decision is a clear victory for the proponents of the
worldwide combined reporting method, though the effect of such victory will
likely have limited ramifications mainly due to a galvanized business and inter-
national community. However, the recent developments in Congress and in the
legislatures of some states may prove to bear interesting future implementations
of such taxing schemes.
246. Id.
247. Christopher J. Dicharry, Expanding Louisiana's Corporate Income Tax Base, 41 LA. Bus. J. 416, 418
(Feb. 1994).
248. Jeremy Kahn, Congress Ponders Change in Foreign Company Tax, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994, at 4.
249. Id.
250. Consider the potential effects of federal adoption as compared to the response to the adoption by
California. See supra note 6.
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